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     ABSTRACT  
 
From the responses received from the European Commission’s consultation on control 
structures in audit firms and their consequences on the audit market, a consultation which 
was launched in November 2008, and whose deadline was scheduled for the end of February 
2009, the role played by the facilitation of greater access to external financial capital as a 
means of increasing access to the audit market, hence opening up the market for the audit of 
international companies to more suppliers, and encouraging new market players, was 
acknowledged. However, this factor on its own, coupled with the need to amend current rules 
on the control of audit firms, namely through a relaxation of the rules – beyond that which is 
currently permitted under Article 3 of the 2006 Statutory Audit Directive, was not considered 
to be the most important source of impediment to the emergence of new players. Other further 
possible catalysts, both on the supply side (namely auditors) and the demand side 
(companies), were also considered vital to efforts aimed at encouraging more players in 
gaining access to the international audit market. 
 
This paper will focus on greater access to external financial capital - as a means of lowering 
barriers to the international audit market. In arriving at the conclusion that the benefits 
associated with the external investor model outweigh the possible risks it generates, the paper 
not only considers theories on managerial behaviour and ownership structure, but also gives 
attention to the safeguards for audit independence as listed under the 2002 Statutory 
Auditors’ Independence in the EU: A Set of Fundamental Principles, and the 2006 Statutory 
Audit Directive. It will also consider why, in view of the limitations and restrictions placed on 
audit firms, with particular reference to the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, actions aimed at 
encouraging new market players at EU level, whilst ensuring that auditors’ independence and 
audit quality are not compromised, would also require a consideration of an international 
dimension of issues involved in lowering barriers to entry. 
 
Key words: 2006 Statutory Audit Directive; non audit services; regulation; audit 
concentration; governance; audit independence; Sarbanes Oxley Act. 
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Regulating the International Audit Market and the Removal of Barriers to Entry: The 
Provision of Non Audit Services by Audit Firms and the 2006 Statutory Audit Directive 
     Marianne Ojo1 
 
1. Introduction  
The role played by audit markets in determining the degree of financial stability is attributed 
to the level of audit concentration which currently exists in the financial markets. Since the 
demise of Arthur Andersen, regulators have become increasingly more aware of the systemic 
consequences which could result in the event of a major audit firm’s sudden exit from the 
audit market. The loss of one of such audit firms, it is acknowledged2, would not only have “ 
a serious impact on public confidence for audit services” but also had the potential to trigger a 
“crisis of confidence” in financial markets – given the prominent role assumed by auditors in 
the company-investor relationship. Further, a market where high audit concentration exists 
has the following disadvantages, namely: The likelihood that audit incentives could be 
impaired owing to the Big Four’s awareness of their dominant position in the market and a 
“too big to fail policy’ which the government might be compelled to implement; the limited 
impact of a threat of a loss of reputation (major audit firm’s reputation)3 – this situation would 
have been different if a high level of competition existed in such a market; lower quality of 
audits. 
 
As a result, the need to provide external investors with greater access to the international audit 
market, reduce the market share retained by the Big Four audit firms and ensure that present 
market structure does not deteriorate further than its present state, the importance of 
implementing measures at European level - measures which would not only facilitate the 
entry of new market players, but also preserve the level of audit quality and audit 
independence, have been re iterated.4 The main areas which constituted the focus of 
consideration during a recent consultation exercise5 included: The need to ensure greater 
access to the international audit market, the need for greater integration within the European 
market - as well as facilitating greater integration within audit firms and networks, the need to 
consider changes to the rules which govern control structures and, the preservation of audit 
independence6. From these topics, greater consideration will be given to the need for greater 
                                                 
1 Research fellow, Center for European Law and Politics (ZERP), University of Bremen; Graduate Teaching 
Associate, Oxford Brookes University. 
2 See “Consultation on Control Structures in Audit Firms and their Consequences on the Audit Market” at page 7 
< http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/auditing/docs/market/consultation2008/summary_report_en.pdf> (last 
visited 3 November 2009) 
3 See also J Bigus and R Zimmerman, ‘Non Audit Fees, Market Leaders and Concentration in the German Audit 
Market: A Descriptive Analysis’ (2008)International Journal of Auditing  Vol 12 at page 174 
4 See statement by C McCreevy ‘International audit market: consultation respondents recognise need to remove 
barriers to entry’ < 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1139&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&
guiLanguage=en>  
5 This was carried out by the Directorate General for Internal Market and Services . Having been launched in 
November 2008, the deadline for the receipt of responses to the exercise was February 2009. 
6 The need for additional measures which would safeguard independence at European level and means whereby 
such safeguards could be consolidated, were also given due consideration. See < 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/auditing/docs/market/consultation2008/summary_report_en.pdf> at page 4 
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integration within the European market (and efforts which have been undertaken so far to 
promote such an aim), the need to consider changes in the rules relating to control structures 
and audit independence. These topics will be considered against the background of 
developments and progress in relation to the Statutory Audit Directive, and how a change in 
the rules on control structures affect audit independence. In relation to audit independence, 
focus will be given to non audit services (NAS) – this being one of the factors which have 
been identified as having the potential to impair auditors’ independence.7 
 
The general response to the consultation topic involving greater introduction of new market 
entrants at international level indicated that respondents favoured such an initiative – whilst 
highlighting the importance of sustaining high level audit quality.8 Furthermore, those 
respondents who indicated that the problem (relating to the need for greater access to the 
international audit market) was that of a lack of choice, generally emphasized that this did not 
imply a lack of competition.9 
 
This paper will focus on the facilitation of greater access to external financial capital as a 
means of increasing access to the audit market - even though other catalysts which could 
encourage more players to gain access to the international audit market exist. Catalysts on the 
supply side include:10 the need for greater harmonisation through a harmonisation of the 
independence rules and other ethical requirements for auditing, the application at EU level of 
“more restrictive rules” on the provision of non audit services which could enable smaller 
firms to be more competitive (since the Big Four who provide a wide range of non audit 
services may be prohibited from placing bids in particular situations); consideration that 
harmonisation of rules associated with the limitation of auditors’ liability would provide an 
incentive for audit firms to access the international market; and the adoption of international 
auditing standards to facilitate harmonisation within the EU audit market. The sections within 
this paper are structured as follows: Section one will commence with an analysis which traces 
developments and legislation which have emerged in the EU in response to the collapse of 
Enron. Such an analysis will incorporate a description and an assessment of the extent to 
which prohibition of non audit services by audit firms and the disclosure of audit 
remuneration has occurred in Germany and in the UK. This will then lead to a discussion on 
audit independence within the context of the controversial debate on whether or not the 
provision of non audit services generates more benefits than risks for the audit of financial 
statements. The next section then considers not only how a more integrated single audit 
market at European level can be achieved, but also why this is necessary. Within this 
framework, the 2006 Statutory Audit Directive will be introduced. 
 
The section which then follows will elaborate on how an amendment to the rules on the 
control of audit firms, beyond the scope which is presently prescribed by Article 3 of the 
Statutory Audit Directive, could be achieved. Further a consideration which involves not only 
the drawbacks of such a proposal, but other possible alternatives, will be undertaken. 
Arguments in favour of and against a majority of external investors will then be considered in 
the sixth section of the paper. The seventh section will focus on the impact which could be 
generated (by an amendment to ownership rules and external capital), on audit independence, 
                                                 
7 Other situations where the impairment of audit independence could occur, as identified by Quick and 
Rasmussen include personal interaction, financial interest and personal relationships. See R Quick and B 
Warming-Rasmussen, ‘Auditor Independence and the Provision of Non Audit Services: Perceptions by German 
Investors’(2009) International Journal of Auditing Volume 13 at page 142 
8 See “Consultation on Control Structures in Audit Firms and their Consequences on the Audit Market” 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/auditing/docs/market/consultation2008/summary_report_en.pdf> at page 7 
9 ibid at page 6 
10 ibid at pages 16-19 
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as well as proposed safeguards which should operate to counter risks posed by the existence 
of external investors. 
 
Whether more stringent regulations on audit liability should be introduced (or not), will 
constitute the focus of consideration in the penultimate section. This would facilitate a 
discussion on principles and rules based approaches to regulation and also provide an 
illustration of each approach – with particular reference to Sarbanes Oxley’s rules based 
approach to regulation and whether the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) is actually remedying or 
aggravating the problem which it is supposed to cure. The concluding section draws on how 
the 2006 Statutory Audit Directive, along with other proposals advanced during the course of 
the paper, could help lower the barriers to entry within the audit market – whilst ensuring that 
audit quality is not undermined and that audit independence is not compromised.  
 
 
 
2. Legislative developments which have taken place to improve the auditor’s 
independence 
 
Audit related legislation which existed prior to the Enron scandal include the Fourth Council 
Directive,11 the Seventh Council Directive12 and the Eighth Council Directive13. In 2002, the 
European Commission issued a Recommendation of a set of fundamental principles regarding 
the statutory auditor’s independence: “Statutory Auditors’ Independence in the EU: A Set of 
Fundamental Principles” .14The Recommendation considered two key independence issues 
raised by the collapse of Enron, namely "provision of additional services" by auditors and 
their "employment with the audit client.15 The principles also provided details on the scope 
and responsibility of statutory auditors, and stipulated systems of safeguards, independence 
threats and risks.16 In view of other financial scandals, a revised Eight Directive17 was 
proposed. However the Eight Council Directive has been repealed by the 2006 Statutory 
Audit Directive18 which also amends the Fourth and Seventh Council directives.  
 
In Germany, these developments were responded to with the imposition of additional 
restrictions in the German Commercial Code.19 Whilst involvement in the retention of the 
client’s accounting records and the preparation of its annual financial statements had been 
previously prohibited, the prohibition of “provision of legal or tax advisory services in the 
                                                 
11 Council Directive 78/660/EEC which imposes the requirement that all companies under the Directive be 
audited by a qualified professional 
12 Council Directive  83/349/EEC  
13 Which having set out conditions for the approval of persons responsible for carrying out statutory audits, was 
criticised for failing to provide specific guidance on auditor independence. 
14 See ‘Auditing: Commission issues Recommendation on independence of statutory auditors’ < 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/02/723&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&g
uiLanguage=en> (last visited 4 November 2009) 
15 ibid 
16 See “Statutory Auditors’ Independence in the EU: A Set of Fundamental Principles”< 
http://www.iasplus.com/resource/euaudit.pdf> 
17 For further information on the revised Eight Directive and a comprehensive comparison between it and the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act, see C Strohm, United States and European Union Audit Independence Regulation: 
Implications for Regulators and Auditing Practice  2006 DUV 
18 DIRECTIVE 2006/43/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
of 17 May 2006 on statutory audits of annual accounts and consolidated accounts 
19 See R Quick and B Rasmussen ‘Auditor Independence and the Provision of Non Audit Services: Perceptions 
by German Investors’(2009) International Journal of Auditing Volume 13 at page 145 
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financial statements which were to be audited, constituted part of additional restrictions which 
were added in December 2004.20 
 
Furthermore, the amended Code, with particular reference to §§285 I No 17, 314 I No 9 HGB 
stipulates the requirement that listed companies disclose audit and non audit fees paid to them 
as from the financial year 2005.21 
 
 
The debates revolving round the provision by audit firms, of non audit services have proved 
more controversial in the UK. Whilst companies, accountancy firms and even the ACCA22 
have put forward arguments in support of the need to provide non audit services23, the UK 
Treasury Select Committee in its Ninth Report24 stated that it believed that …”investor 
confidence and trust in audits would be enhanced by a prohibition on audit firms conducting 
non audit work for the same company”… and recommended that a consultation should be 
carried out by the Financial Reporting Council in relation to their proposal.25  
 
According to the Financial Reporting Council (FRC), who in response to the Select 
Committee’s recommendation issued a consultation paper through the Auditing Practices 
Board, the views of “certain representatives of the investor community” and “particular 
commentators”26 were instrumental in the UK Treasury Select Committee’s decision to 
recommend a consultation on the prohibition of non audit services.27  
 
Such a proposal by the Select Committee and the recommendation that the FRC consult on 
the proposal, signifies a change in the approach to non audit services – having due regards to 
the early developments which took place in the aftermath of Enron’s collapse. Following 
Enron’s collapse, the Coordinating Group on Audit and Accounting (CGAA) was established 
to review the UK’s arrangement for audit and accountancy. A complete prohibition of the 
provision of non audit services (by firms conducting non audit work for the same company) 
                                                 
20 ibid 
21 See J Bigus and R Zimmerman, ‘Non Audit Fees, Market Leaders and Concentration in the German Audit 
Market: A Descriptive Analysis’ (2008)International Journal of Auditing  Vol 12 at page 160. The study carried 
out by Bigus and Zimmerman benefited from this amended in that previously unaccounted questions related to 
audit and non audit fees are now subject to disclosure – hence facilitating the study – which is the first to present 
the weight of non audit fees in the audit market in Germany to international observers. See ibid  
22 Association of Chartered Certified Accountants; The ACCA is also of the opinion that an outright separation 
of audit and non audit services would neither be feasible or preferred and that some services are closely related 
to audit – whilst insight into the audit firm adds benefits of quality and efficiency which businesses would not 
want to forego. Also see I Welch, “Should Cross Selling of Non Audit fees be Banned? FRC Consults on MPs 
Recommendation” 12 October 2009 < http://blogs.accaglobal.com/business_blog/2009/10/heading-to-
come.html> 
23 Arguments put forward revolve round a broader debate which views audit training as a crucial aspect of being 
an accountant and the fact an outright prohibition of non audit services to audit clients could result in audits 
being considered as a “specialist activity” . See I Welch, “Should Cross Selling of Non Audit fees be Banned? 
FRC Consults on MPs Recommendation” 12 October 2009 < 
http://blogs.accaglobal.com/business_blog/2009/10/heading-to-come.html> 
24 Treasury Ninth Report, ‘Banking Crisis: reforming corporate governance and pay in the City’ May 2009 < 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmtreasy/758/2070213.htm> (last visited 10 
Novemeber 2009) 
25 See ‘APB issues a Consultation Paper on audit firms providing non-audit services to listed companies that they 
audit’ < http://www.frc.org.uk/apb/press/pub2125.html> (last visited 10 November 2009) 
26 Who expressed doubts concerning the auditor’s ability to sustain independence whilst providing non audit 
services 
27 See I Welch, “Should Cross Selling of Non Audit fees be Banned? FRC Consults on MPs Recommendation” 
12 October 2009 < http://blogs.accaglobal.com/business_blog/2009/10/heading-to-come.html> 
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was excluded at the time – with the CGAA deciding that tougher measures were required to 
ensure that auditors were not only independent, but perceived to be independent.28  
 
In early 2003, the government decided that the responsibilities for setting standards for the 
integrity, objectivity and independence of audits should be transferred from the professional 
bodies to the Auditing Practices Board (part of the FRC).29 Consequently, these standards 
were issued by the APB in 2004.30 The Companies (Disclosure of Auditor Remuneration) 
Regulations 2005 came into force on the 1st of October 2005. According to the legislation, 
companies are required “to disclose in the notes to the annual accounts the remuneration paid 
to a company’s auditors for non audit services split between: 
 
Any remuneration receivable by the company’s auditors for the auditing of the 
accounts, and 
 Any remuneration for the supply of other services to the company or its associates31 
 
 
3. Audit Independence and Non Audit Services (NAS) 
 
 
According to the 2002 Principles establishing a set of fundamental principles,32  
“The requirement that a Statutory Auditor should be independent addresses both: 
 Independence of mind, i.e. the state of mind which has regard to all considerations 
relevant to the task in hand, but no others; and 
 
Independence in appearance, i.e. the avoidance of facts and circumstances which are 
so significant that a reasonable and informed third party would question the Statutory 
Auditor’s ability to act objectively.” 
 
 
 
According to Article 22 paragraph 2 of the Statutory Audit Directive33 
 
Member States shall ensure that a statutory auditor or an audit firm shall not carry out a statutory audit if there is 
any direct or indirect financial, business, employment or other relationship 
— including the provision of additional non-audit services — between the statutory auditor, audit firm or 
network and the audited entity from which an objective, reasonable and informed third party would conclude that 
the statutory auditor's or audit firm's independence is compromised. 
If the statutory auditor's or audit firm's independence is affected by threats, such as self-review, self-interest, 
advocacy, familiarity or trust or intimidation, the statutory auditor or audit firm must apply safeguards in order to 
                                                 
28 See paragraphs 4.1 and 4.2 of Auditing Practices Board Ethical Standards: Consultation on Audit Firms 
Providing Non Audit Services to Listed Companies that they Audit ‘CGAA Review of the Arrangements for 
Audit and Accountancy in the UK’ at page 9. Furthermore, it was particularly recommended that whilst UK 
requirements should continue to apply a principles rather than rules based approach to regulation, that clearer 
and tougher safeguards would be required to ensure that the joint provision of audit and non audit services would 
not compromise audit independence “in fact or appearance” and that this was to be achieved through: 
Regulation of audit firms by: Independent setting of auditor independence standards; tougher 
requirements governing the supply of NAS to audit clients; and emphasis within the monitoring system 
on the application of these requirements in the major audit firms. See paragraph 4.3 ibid. 
29 Ibid at page 10 
30 ibid 
31 ibid at page 19 
32 See Statutory Auditors’ Independence in the EU: A Set of Fundamental Principles  
< http://www.iasplus.com/resource/euaudit.pdf> at page 22 
33 DIRECTIVE 2006/43/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
of 17 May 2006 on statutory audits of annual accounts and consolidated accounts 
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mitigate those threats. If the significance of the threats compared to the safeguards applied is such that his, her or 
its independence is compromised, the statutory auditor or audit firm shall not carry out the statutory audit. 
 
The provision of non audit services by audit firms has generated many controversial debates 
over the years. Questions related to such debates revolve round issues concerning whether the 
provision of non audit services by audit firms really impairs independence. Further, if the 
provision of NAS do indeed impair audit independence, to what extent is an auditor’s 
independence compromised and do the disadvantages related to such an impairment actually 
outweigh the benefits derived by audit firms in their provision of NAS?  
 
The figures below, as published by the Financial Director, reveal a steep decline in the ratio 
of non audit to audit fees in listed companies since the collapse of Enron. 
 
 
 
Source: 34 
 
 
Arguments advanced in favour of the provision of non audit services by audit firms  
 
Whilst the debate on the provision of non audit services has proved contentious35, arguments 
in favour of the provision of non audit services by audit firms as set out in the APB’s 
Consultation Document36 are as follows: 
 
 That the provision of non audit services provides a valuable means of a company 
benefiting from external expertise, hence enabling management to focus on key 
business activities 
 
 Auditors have the confidence of management and already know the company well and 
do not require the same degree of briefing and oversight as would be required by firms 
who are unfamiliar with the company. This could result in benefits linked to cost, 
quality and consistency – which in turn would benefit shareholders 
 
                                                 
34 Auditing Practices Board Ethical Standards: Consultation on Audit Firms Providing Non Audit Services to 
Listed Companies that they Audit page16. In 2005/06, a collaboration between the Financial Reporting Council 
and the then Department of Trade and Industry resulted in an investigation into the level of competition and 
choice in the market for the provision of audit services. It was observed that the provision of non audit services 
by the company’s auditor could hinder competition and choice in relation to the provision of audit services. See 
page 20 of Auditing Practices Board Ethical Standards: Consultation on Audit Firms Providing Non Audit 
Services to Listed Companies that they Audit 
35 For further literature on such debates, see R Quick and B Warming-Rasmussen, ‘Auditor Independence and 
the Provision of Non Audit Services: Perceptions by German Investors (2009) International Journal of Auditing 
(13) 141-162  and M Ezzamel, DR Gwilliam and KM Holland, ‘The Relationship between Categories of Non- 
Audit Services and Audit Fees: Evidence from UK Companies’ (2002) International Journal of Auditing (6) 13-
35 
36 Ethical Standards: Consultation on Audit Firms Providing Non Audit Services to Listed Companies that they 
Audit, see pages 6 and 7. For information relating to arguments advanced by accountancy firms who support the 
provision of non audit services to audit clients see page 7. 
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 That corporate regime already ensures that non audit services are purchased without 
the fear that audit independence would be compromised 
 
 
4. Towards a more integrated single audit market at European level 
 
The 2006 Statutory Audit Directive37 acknowledges the importance of cooperation between 
member states at European level if the objectives of the Directive are to be realised. 
 
Paragraph 32 of the Preamble reads: 
 
Since the objectives of this Directive — namely requiring the application of a single set of international auditing 
standards, the updating of the educational requirements, the definition of professional ethics and the technical 
implementation of the cooperation between competent authorities of Member States and between those 
authorities and the authorities of third countries, in order further to enhance and harmonise the quality of 
statutory audit in the Community and to facilitate cooperation between Member States and with third countries 
so as to strengthen confidence in the statutory audit — cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member Statesand 
can therefore, by reason of the scale and effects of this Directive, be better achieved at Community level, the 
Community may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the 
Treaty. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Directive does not go 
beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives. 
 
A single audit market at European level would also facilitate the introduction of audit liability 
caps at EU level.38 The introduction of liability caps would not only reduce the likelihood of a 
large sized audit firm’s failure, but could also reduce market concentration in audit markets. 
According to the responses which were received in relation to the topic on greater integration 
within the European market, respondents highlighted the urgency in establishing a single audit 
market at European level. In doing so, they pointed out factors which have served as sources 
of impediment to such a goal, namely, lack of sufficiently integrated legal framework and 
supervisory structures in the EU.39 
The effectiveness of proposals aimed at reducing market barriers depends on a number of 
factors – amongst which include the demand for audits in particular jurisdictions. The demand 
for audits in jurisdictions where capital market based transactions occur at a higher volume, 
jurisdictions such as that of the UK and the US could be considered to be higher than that of 
jurisdictions such as Germany and Italy. Audit markets with relatively few large clients are 
referred to as thin markets.40 Germany has been classed as having a relatively thin market as 
relatively few companies are public limited companies (AGs) – hence audit concentration is 
likely to be high. Having considered a number of factors41 including the long tradition of 
historical cost accounting and limited disclosure – from which they inferred that accountants 
and auditors are less familiar with fair value accounting than in the UK or the US, and that 
                                                 
37 DIRECTIVE 2006/43/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
of 17 May 2006 on statutory audits of annual accounts and consolidated accounts 
38 For more information on audit liability caps, see M Ojo ‘Proposals For a New Audit Liability Regime in 
Europe’ and ‘Limiting Audit Firms’ Liability: A Step in the Right Direction? (Proposals For a New Audit 
Liability Regime in Europe Revisited) The Accountant July 2009 Issue 6068 
39 Consultation on Control Structures in Audit Firms and their Consequences on the Audit Market” at page 7 < 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/auditing/docs/market/consultation2008/summary_report_en.pdf> 
40 See M Ojo ‘The Role of the External Auditor in Bank Regulation and Supervision: A Comparative Analysis 
between the UK, Germany, Italy and the US (2008) VDM 
41 Such factors include the absence of market values, the fact that fair value accounting necessitates greater 
“know-how” in valuation techniques than historical accounting. See J Bigus and R Zimmerman, ‘Non Audit 
Fees, Market Leaders and Concentration in the German Audit Market: A Descriptive Analysis’ 
(2008)International Journal of Auditing  Vol 12 at page 161 
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market entry may be less difficult than in the UK and the US, Bigus and Zimmerman initially 
concluded  that a lower degree of market concentration could be expected in Germany than in 
the USA and the UK. However their findings indicated a somewhat different result.42 
 
Furthermore, Bigus and Zimmerman argue that in introducing audit liability caps, 
consideration should be had towards the possibility that audit incentives may be impaired.43 
As additional measures, actions aimed at the consolidation of competition, actions such as 
those which would make market entry much easier, have been proposed.44Such actions (apart 
from the introduction of low audit liability caps), include the enactment of less complex and 
less rigid regulations on accounting and auditing.45 Means of achieving such an aim, as 
recommended, include a change from fair value accounting to historical cost accounting.46 
This option is provided given their acknowledgement of the fact that low liability caps may 
not necessarily deter market concentration.47 
 
In relation to audits of most of the international companies and according to responses 
obtained from the consultation, the actual choice available is greater than those provided by 
the Big Four and is inclusive of services which can be offered by mid tier audit firms.48 
However, owing to lack of recognition of the capabilities of such mid tier audit firms who are 
able to work in the international audit market but are presently finding it difficult to “break 
into” the market, such firms are placed at a disadvantage.49 
5. Amendment to rules on the control of audit firms to allow for capital investments from 
external investors, beyond what is currently prescribed by Article 3 of the Statutory Audit 
Directive. 
 
 
 
The Statutory Auditors’ Independence in the EU: A Set of Fundamental Principles 
imposed a requirement that the majority of voting rights in a firm be held by qualified 
auditors – these being permitted to undertake statutory audits in the EU. 
 
                                                 
42 See ibid; The results of their findings indicate a lower level of concentration in the UK and the USA than in 
Germany, whilst Switzerland appeared to have a higher level of concentration than Germany. See also page 175 
ibid where results also indicated that Germany and the UK have comparable levels of concentration in their audit 
markets whilst concentration levels are higher in Switzerland (than in Germany) and lower in the USA (than in 
Germany) 
43 J Bigus and R Zimmerman, ‘Non Audit Fees, Market Leaders and Concentration in the German Audit Market: 
A Descriptive Analysis’ (2008)International Journal of Auditing  Vol 12 at page 174 
44 ibid at pages 174-175 
45 ibid at 175 
46 ibid 
47 ibid 
48 See ‘Summary Report: Consultation on Control Structures in Audit Firms and their Consequences on the 
Audit Market’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/auditing/docs/market/consultation2008/summary_report_en.pdf> at page 6 
49 ibid 
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Section 4.3 which deals with the Statutory Auditor’s Overall Safeguards, in relation to the 
ownership and control over audit firms, provides under section 4.3.1 that:50 
 
“If the Statutory Auditor is an Audit Firm, at least the majority of the firm’s voting rights 
(50% plus one vote) must be held by persons who are authorised to perform Statutory Audits 
within the European Union (statutory auditors). The Statutory Auditor’s legal statutes should 
contain provisions to ensure that a non-auditor owner could not gain control over the Audit 
Firm.” 
Whilst Chapter II Article 3(4) of the 2006 Statutory Audit Directive reinforces the 
requirement of majority voting rights51, Article 1(6) reflects a more relaxed and flexible 
approach:  
(6) Audit qualifications obtained by statutory auditors on the basis of this Directive should be considered 
equivalent. It should therefore no longer be possible for Member States to insist that a majority of the voting 
rights in an audit firm must be held by locally approved auditors or that a majority of the members of the 
administrative or management body of an audit firm must be locally approved. 
A modification in ownership rules would provide non Big 4 audit firms with greater access to 
compete in the financial market. Furthermore, less stringent ownership rules would not only 
facilitate greater integration between audit firms on a cross border basis, but also, greater and 
speedier access to capital could also limit liability risks and facilitate the re capitalisation of a 
firm 52 
 
 
From the results obtained, 43% (the majority) indicated their support of a change in the 
present rules relating to the control of audit firms.53 Furthermore, results indicated that in 
order to facilitate capital investments from external investors, rules on the control of audit 
firms should be amended.54 Various options proposed in relation to how such an amendment 
could occur include:55 (i) Consideration of an external investor model based on voting rights – 
the majority of these now being acquired by non auditors. This could be facilitated through a 
prohibition on any measures which could serve as a source of impediment to external 
investors who may wish to acquire majority shareholdings and voting rights in a firm; (ii) 
Consideration of a “multi disciplinary practice model” which is based on the provision of 
capital by auditors and members of other regulated professions – again with the restriction 
that qualified auditors would not be able to acquire the majority of the capital; (iii) 
Consideration of state owned bodies functioning under the same rules and control structure as 
                                                 
50 Statutory Auditors’ Independence in the EU: A Set of Fundamental Principles, 
<http://www.iasplus.com/resource/euaudit.pdf> at page 8 of 54 
51 Article 3(4)(c) of the Chapter reads: “a majority — up to a maximum of 75 % — of the members of the 
administrative or management body of the entity must be audit firms which are approved in any Member State or 
natural persons who satisfy at least the conditions imposed by Articles 4 and 6 to 12. Member States may 
provide that such natural persons must also have been approved in another Member State. Where such a body 
has no more than two members, one of those members must satisfy at least the conditions in this point” 
52 See ‘Summary Report: Consultation on Control Structures in Audit Firms and their Consequences on the 
Audit Market’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/auditing/docs/market/consultation2008/summary_report_en.pdf> at pages 
11and 12 
53 see ibid  <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/auditing/docs/market/consultation2008/summary_report_en.pdf 
>at page 10; 33% of the respondents were undecided whilst 24%were against any change 
54 See ibid at page 8 
55 ibid at page 11 
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commercial audit firms. Identified disadvantages attributed to a state owned model include its 
remunerative attracting power – that is, the likelihood that its level of remuneration may not 
meet that of the private sector . Furthermore, political concerns (relating to such a model) 
attributed to exposure of public funding were reiterated by some of the respondents; (iv) A 
hybrid model consisting of a collaboration between external investors and/or funding from the 
taxpayer; and finally (v) The extension of majority ownership to embrace auditors and audit 
firms from third countries who are subject to the same degree of supervision as those firms 
within the EU – and also providing means of ensuring that audit quality is sustained on a 
global level. 
 
State control and state intervention are proposed as alternatives in the event that a regulator 
does not wish to relax regulations in order to facilitate market entry.56 However the 
difficulties associated with state control as revealed during the recent financial crises, are also 
highlighted.57 Furthermore, it is contended that even if state agent were able to obtain 
adequate resources and retain highly qualified employees, and even if they were not pursuing 
their own interests, the likelihood that accounting scandals would not be detected on time, 
would still exist.58 
Even though it was generally agreed by the respondents that there was a need to make 
international audit market more accessible to external investors and reduce the market share 
retained by Big Four audit firms, totally lifting all ownership rules, in the opinion of many 
respondents, was considered not to be an optimal idea.59 This was attributed to the fact that 
the retention of some restrictions on the governance of audit firms is still considered 
necessary as a means of fostering supervision and accountability.60 
6. Arguments in favour of and against a majority of external investors 
Arguments against a majority of external investors include:61 The likelihood of increased 
costs of capital since equity investors could require compensating returns for their acceptance 
of greater risks, the likelihood that external investments could be deterred- owing to an 
unlimited liability regime, the possibility that a reduction in choice and impeded competition 
could actually occur – owing to breach of independence rules and conflicts of interests 
generated where such external investors are involved in other investments and business 
relationships. 
Impact of an amendment of ownership rules and external capital on auditor independence 
Concern was expressed amongst most of the respondents to the consultation that audit quality 
would not only be impaired, but that audit independence would also be compromised.62 These 
                                                 
56 See J Bigus and R Zimmerman, ‘Non Audit Fees, Market Leaders and Concentration in the German Audit 
Market: A Descriptive Analysis’ (2008)International Journal of Auditing  Vol 12 at page 175 
57 ibid 
58 ibid 
59 See ‘Summary Report: Consultation on Control Structures in Audit Firms and their Consequences on the 
Audit Market’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/auditing/docs/market/consultation2008/summary_report_en.pdf> at page 11 
60 ibid 
61 ibid at page 12 
62 Further concerns were also indicated in relation to the negative consequences that an amendment could 
generate on public perception of the independence of the audit profession. ibid at page 13 
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concerns were partly attributed to their consideration that the risk of the management of a 
firm, based on profit margins rather than on audit quality, would be introduced.63 
 
 
 
 
More dispersed ownership is expected to result in greater reliance being placed on the audit as 
a mechanism of governance.64 Therefore it could be argued that the corresponding move in 
placing a greater reliance on audits, although this might be more costly, should help alleviate 
concerns related to audit independence. Furthermore, as argued by Jensen and Meckling, even 
though dispersed ownership would presuppose higher probabilities that managers would wish 
to further self interests at the expense of owners, they argue that such managers are not only 
aware of the resulting increased agency costs, but also expected to limit such costs and would 
respond by committing themselves to more extensive audits.65 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Proposed safeguards which should operate to counter risks posed by the existence of 
external investors include:66 
 
 
- examples of safeguards proposed by respondents in relation to the governance of audit 
firms (The extension of ethical guidance to owners who are not auditors, modification 
of governance rules for audit firms) 
- examples of safeguards which relate to capital and voting rights (prohibition of capital 
provision to non auditors) 
- examples of safeguards based on actions taken by the regulator 
 
 
It is difficult to draw a conclusion on whether additional safeguards should be prescribed with 
a change in ownership rules – given the fact that sufficient safeguards appear to be in place. 
Safeguards are provided for under section 4 of the 2002 Set of Fundamental Principles67 and 
under Article 22 of the 2006 Statutory Audit Directive. 
 
 
                                                 
63 ibid 
64 N O’Sullivan and SR Diacon, ‘Impact of Ownership, Governance and Non Audit Services on Audit Fees: 
Evidence from the Insurance Industry’(2002) International Journal of Auditing Volume 6 at page 95; also see P 
Chan, M Ezzamel, and D Gwilliam, ‘Determinants of audit fees for quoted U.K. companies’ (1993) Journal of 
Business Finance & Accounting, 20, pp. 765-786. 
65 N O’Sullivan and SR Diacon, ‘Impact of Ownership, Governance and Non Audit Services on Audit Fees: 
Evidence from the Insurance Industry’(2002) International Journal of Auditing Volume 6 at page 95; and MC 
Jensen and WH Meckling , ‘Theory of the firm: managerial behaviour, agency costs and ownership structure’ 
(1976) Journal of Financial Economics, 3, pp. 305-360. 
 
66 See ‘Summary Report: Consultation on Control Structures in Audit Firms and their Consequences on the 
Audit Market’at pages 15 and 16  
67 See ‘COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION of 16 May 2002 Statutory Auditors' Independence in the EU: A 
Set of Fundamental Principles’<http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2002:191:0022:0057:EN:PDF (last visited 11 November 
2009) 
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8. More Stringent Regulations or Consideration of the Need to Facilitate Market Entry?: 
Rule based and Principles Based Approaches to Regulation  
 
Even though work is required on the legal framework and supervisory structures at European 
level, other global related issues need to be considered. Financial scandals such as that of 
Enron have resulted in more stringent audit liability measures in the form of higher corporate 
governance and auditing standards.68 In attempting to address the issues related to audit 
independence, namely the provision of non audit services, the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 
(SOX) with its more detailed and rules based approach to regulation has placed further 
restrictions on transactions carried out on the international audit market scene and in doing so, 
raised the barriers to entry for potential market participants. 
According to the Commission Recommendation of 2002, “Statutory Auditors’ Independence 
in the EU: A Set of Fundamental Principles”69 
A principles-based approach to statutory auditors' independence is preferable to one based on detailed 
rules because it creates a robust structure within which statutory auditors have to justify their actions. It 
also provides the audit profession and its regulators with the flexibility to react promptly and effectively 
to new developments in business and in the audit environment. At the same time, it avoids the highly 
legalistic and rigid approach to what is and is not permitted which can arise in a rules-based regime. A 
principles-based approach can cater for the almost infinite variations in individual circumstances that 
arise in practice and in the different legal environments throughout the EU. Consequently, a principles-
based approach will better serve the needs of European capital markets, as well as those of SMEs. 
 
The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 imposed a prohibition on nine non audit services, measures 
aimed at improving audit independence. Section 20170 of the Act provides: 
“It shall be "unlawful" for a registered public accounting firm to provide any non-audit 
service to an issuer contemporaneously with the audit, including: (1) bookkeeping or other 
services related to the accounting records or financial statements of the audit client; (2) 
financial information systems design and implementation; (3) appraisal or valuation services, 
fairness opinions, or contribution-in-kind reports; (4) actuarial services; (5) internal audit 
outsourcing services; (6) management functions or human resources; (7) broker or dealer, 
investment adviser, or investment banking services; (8) legal services and expert services 
unrelated to the audit; (9) any other service that the Board determines, by regulation, is 
impermissible. The Board may, on a case-by-case basis, exempt from these prohibitions any 
person, issuer, public accounting firm, or transaction, subject to review by the Commission.” 
 
In contrast to Sarbanes Oxley, the revised Eighth Council Directive71 and the 2006 Statutory 
Audit Directive adopt a principles based approach to regulation72. This is expressly stipulated 
under Chapter IV Article 22 paragraph 4 which states: 
                                                 
68 See W Doralt and others, ‘ Auditors’ Liability and its Impact on the European Financial Markets’ (2008) 67 
Cambridge Law Journal at page 62 
69 See paragraph 11 ‘COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION of 16 May 2002 Statutory Auditors' Independence 
in the EU: A Set of Fundamental Principles’<http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2002:191:0022:0057:EN:PDF< 
70 Services Outside The Scope Of Practice Of Auditors 
71 See C Strohm, United States and European Union Audit Independence Regulation: Implications for 
Regulators and Auditing Practice 2006 DUVat page 65;’Exploration of Non-Professional Ownership Structures 
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4. In order to ensure confidence in the audit function and to ensure uniform application of paragraphs 1 and 2 of 
this 
Article, the Commission may, in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 48(2), adopt principle-
based implementing measures concerning: 
(a) the threats and safeguards referred to in paragraph 2; 
(b) the situations in which the significance of the threats, as referred to in paragraph 2, is such that the 
independence of the statutory auditor or audit firm is compromised; 
(c) the cases of self-review and self-interest referred to in the second subparagraph of paragraph 2, in which 
statutory 
audits may or may not be carried out. 
 
 
Whereas Sarbanes Oxley outrightly prohibits the provision of stipulated non audit services, 
the 2006 Statutory Audit Directive leaves it to Member States to determine and decide on 
situations where the auditor’s independence could be considered to have been compromised. 
Various academic literature and research results have indicated that SOX restrictions on non 
audit services may have been a step too far.73 The “unopposed political support” given to 
Sarbanes Oxley has received criticisms and calls for explanations as to why such support was 
given. Further, Brown et al state that a consideration of factors which would explain why 
“self- interested rule makers” may wish to enact governance rules which have little potential 
to improve financial market performance may constitute a worthwhile topic for purposes of 
future research.74 
 
 
 
9. Conclusion 
 
A prohibition on the provision of specific non audit services by the major 4 audit firms whilst 
permitting mid tier audit firms and smaller audit firms to provide non audit services which 
would enable them to become more competitive, could serve a s a powerful tool in facilitating 
greater entry of currently “disadvantaged” audit firms into the audit market. Such a move 
would also foster a higher level of competition whilst ensuring that the level of audit quality s 
not undermined. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
for Audit Firms International Organisation of Securities Commissions Sept 2009 at pages 4 and 5 < 
http://www.cfainstitute.org/centre/topics/comment/2009/pdf/090225.pdf> 
72 The Recommendation issued by the Commission in 2002 on the independence of statutory auditors combines 
its broader safeguards with the principles based approach to independence and these include: 
“the full disclosure, at least annually, of fees for audit and non-audit services, and a written declaration 
confirming independence, which must be made by the auditor to the audit client's governance body, for example 
a board of non-executive Directors or a supervisory board. Furthermore, all EU statutory audits should be subject 
to external quality assurance systems that require auditors to review compliance with ethical principles and rules, 
including independence rules, according to the Commission's existing Recommendation on "Quality Assurance 
for the statutory audit in the EU. See ‘Auditing: Commission issues Recommendation on Independence of 
Statutory Auditors” 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/02/723&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&
guiLanguage=en> 
 
73 See J Brown, D Falaschetti and M Orlando, ‚Auditor Independence and the Quality of Information in 
Financial Disclosures: Evidence for Market Discipline vs Sarbanes-Oxley Proscriptions’ 2009 forthcoming in 
the American Law and Economics Review at pages 1 and 31 of the article.  
74 Ibid at page 32 
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The effectiveness of measures aimed at reducing market barriers to entry of audit markets, to 
an extent, depends on various factors such as the demand for audits in a particular jurisdiction. 
For example, efforts aimed at lowering market barriers/reducing audit concentration, namely 
low liability caps are likely to be more effective in certain jurisdictions than others –
depending on the level of demand for audit markets in these jurisdictions. Other proposals 
aimed at lowering market barriers also have their disadvantages. For example, the enactment 
of less complex or less rigid regulations, as previously highlighted under section four.  
 
 
 
Whether the Sarbanes Oxley Act is functioning effectively as an antidote in addressing the 
issue of audit independence rather than providing necessary ingredients required for a 
potentially lethal cocktail whilst aggravating  the level of audit quality remains to be seen.  
Hopefully the 2006 Statutory Audit Directive, in collaboration with efforts aimed at reducing 
barriers to entry in the international audit market, ensuring that competition is sustained and 
that the quality of audits are not undermined, will provide the much required assistance ( and 
promptly) to avert the impending consequences of the Sarbanes Oxley Act. 
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